

















This paper addresses the ongoing debate on which view of equity, traditional or 
new, that best describes firm behavior. According to the traditional view, the 
marginal source of finance is new equity, whereas under to the new view, marginal 
financing comes from retained earnings. In the theoretical part, we set up a model 
where the firm faces a cost of adjusting the dividend level because of an 
aggravated free cash flow problem. The existence of such a cost - which has been 
used in arguing the traditional view - does not invalidate the core of the new view, 
namely that the marginal investment may be financed with retained earnings. The 
combination of costly changes in dividends and retained earnings as the marginal 
source of funds actually defines an extended new view of equity. In the empirical 
part, we test the implication of the new view that dividends and investments are 
negatively related. The overall conclusion is that the implication of the new view 
is supported for traded Swedish firms during 1980-98.  
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1 Introduction 
There is a broad consensus among economists that taxes do affect firm investments and 
financial decisions and, from a purely tax-oriented perspective, that debt is the most favorable 
source of finance, since interest payments are tax deductible at the firm level and 
shareholders￿ required return is not. When it comes to the choice between new equity and 
retained earnings, the consensus has completely vanished. Until the late sixties and the 
beginning of the seventies, the distinction between new equity and retained earnings was 
largely ignored in tax policy research. The works of Harberger (1962, 1966), which 
constituted the benchmark for a great volume of papers focusing on tax incidence, implicitly 
assumed that firms finance investments with new share issues. That new issues provided the 
marginal source of equity finance was designated as the traditional view by Poterba and 
Summers (1985), which is to be compared to the new view, where firms are assumed to use 
retained earnings as the marginal source of finance. Ever since then, there has been an 
ongoing debate about which view best describes the firms￿ actual behavior. 
 
The notion of the new view, as described in Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981), rests upon 
purely tax-based arguments. More specifically, the new view hinges on the tax discrimination 
between dividends and capital gains. Even in those cases where the statutory tax rates are the 
same, the effective capital gains rate is lower since capital gains are taxed upon realization. 
For ease of presentation, let us assume that the capital gains tax equals zero. It is then clear 
that when a firm undertakes one additional unit of investment, the shareholders must 
immediately forgo one unit of personal income when the investment is financed with new 
equity, but only 1 pd τ −  units when it is financed with retained earnings ( pd τ  denotes the 
personal tax rate on dividends). Using less expensive retained earnings as the marginal source 
of finance implies a lower corporate cost of capital, as compared to the alternative of issuing 
new equity. Hence, tax discrimination gives rise to a clear tax-based pecking order between 
retained earnings and new equity, and the rationale for using retained earnings as the marginal 
source of finance, which is the essence of the new view, rests upon this understanding. 
 
The theoretical argument why new equity should still be regarded as the marginal source of 
finance draws on non-tax factors. Advocates of the traditional view claim that shareholders 
derive a positive benefit from receiving dividends that offsets the tax-penalty implied by 
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higher effective taxes on dividends than on capital gains. This benefit can take different 
forms, with the common feature that it is a result of asymmetric information between 
informed managers and less informed owners. The benefit may arise from the signaling value 
of dividend distribution, see Bhattacharya (1979) among others, or as a reduction in the cost 
of free cash flow, see Jensen (1986). Regardless of the interpretation, the positive non-tax 
benefit from dividends will abolish the tax-based pecking order, i.e. owners will prefer capital 
income in the form of dividends to capital gains. Hence, new equity becomes the source of 
finance at the margin. 
 
Empirical findings supporting the use of dividends as a signal or as a tool for reducing the 
amount of free cash flow within the firm have been interpreted as evidence of the traditional 
view. But, is it really the case that these empirical findings invalidate the new view? In this 
paper we argue that the use of dividends for handling the problem of asymmetric information 
is in accordance with an extended new view.
1 In the pure form of the new view (cf. Auerbach 
(1979)) dividends (at least over a certain threshold, often defined as a fixed fraction of the 
corporate profit) are costless to adjust. Under the extended new view, the firm faces a cost of 
adjusting the dividend level, because of negative signaling effects or aggravated free cash 
flow problems. Based on the free cash flow hypothesis we show that the non-tax benefits used 
for arguing the traditional view do not invalidate the core of the new view, namely that the 
marginal investment may be financed with retained earnings. What is known as the traditional 
view appears as a special and temporal case of the extended new view. 
 
This paper is divided into two parts, one theoretical and one empirical, both of which draw on 
the work by Auerbach and Hassett (2000). In the theoretical part we set up a simple model of 
firm behavior based on the sketch of a model presented in Auerbach and Hassett, where 
dividend distribution will partly be determined by the owners￿ desire to reduce the amount of 
free cash flow within the firm.
2 Such a reduction limits the scope for so-called perk 
consumption by the managers, i.e. consumption or investment activities solely in their 
interest. We show that the managers￿ propensity to indulge in perk consumption may affect 
the firm￿s financial policy. For instance, with a high propensity for perk consumption, the 
                                                 
1 The expression extended new view is used in Auerbach and Hassett (2000), although in a slightly different 
sense. 
2 However, we emphasize that the result can also be interpreted as a consequence of the signaling hypothesis.  3
owner will be reluctant to retain income within the firm and other sources of funds (debt or 
new equity) become more attractive.  
 
The distinction between the new and traditional views then follows from the managers￿ 
propensity for perk consumption. With a low propensity, the cost of free cash flow is low, 
meaning that a firm with small costs can reduce the amount of income distributed as 
dividends, i.e. retain more income, whenever there is a need to finance additional investments. 
This scenario is in accordance with the new view, whereas the traditional view would be the 
case where a (infinitely) high propensity of perk consumption implies that the firm decides to 
distribute its entire income in order to eliminate the cost of free cash flow. With a limited 
supply of retained earnings, the firm may then be forced to seek other sources of finance, i.e. 
debt or new equity. 
 
The theoretical model gives a very simple and intuitive solution, capturing the implication of 
the new view that dividends are negatively related to investments, and that the traditional 
view follows as a special case of the extended new view. To make the model more realistic 
and to put the cost of perk consumption in relation to other costs of funding, we also include 
debt in the model. By using debt, the firm can smooth dividend payments. However, using 
debt as an instrument for dividend smoothing will also incur a cost. A higher debt level is 
assumed to cause higher interest expenses due to a higher probability of bankruptcy, and the 
fact that the bank must spend resources on monitoring to eliminate the risk of perk 
consumption. The aim of the theoretical part is to present a self-contained model illustrating 
the core implication of the new view of equity. However, we are not in a position to derive an 
exact specification to be used for econometric estimation. The model should rather be seen as 
a theoretical motivation for why, and to what extent, dividends and investments are negatively 
related.  
 
In the empirical part of the paper, we will test the implication of the new view that dividends 
are negatively related to investments. For comparison, we first run the same basic tobit 
specifications as in Auerbach and Hassett (2000) on Swedish data. However, Swedish firms 
only distribute dividends once a year and the number of zero observations in the dependent 
variable is considerable lower than that found in the U.S. data. For that reason, we will also 
run some linear specifications, which enables us to make full use of the panel properties of the 
data. When replicating the tobit specifications, it is shown that dividends do respond  4
negatively to investments and positively to cash flow when controlling for the firm￿s market 
value and stock of debt. This conclusion remains under the linear specifications, where a 
change in dividends is determined by a change in investments as well as changes in cash flow, 
market value and debt. Hence, the empirical analysis offers support to the new view. Due to 
the setup of analyzing an implication of the new view, we are not in a position to reject the 
traditional view, however.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a simple model of 
firm behavior where the firm faces a cost for adjusting the dividend level. Numerical 
simulations in section 3 illustrate the negative relationship between dividends and investments 
according to the extended new view. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical 
specifications, while the result of the empirical work is found in section 5. Finally, a short 
summary is offered in section 6.  
 
2 The Model  
We examine the economic behavior of the firm by setting up a dynamic model, where the 
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where β  equals the owner￿s discount rate,  t D  denotes the actual dividends distributed in 
period t and  pd τ  is the personal tax rate on dividends. Without loss of generality we ignore the 
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The production function  () t F K , net the corporate tax τ , also represents the firm￿s income. 
Parameter θ  represents the productivity level. If θ  increases, a positive productivity shock 
has occurred, implying that the existing capital stock in the current period becomes more 
productive and thereby raises the total income. The last three terms in (2) reflect the net 
change in the stock of debt B  between two consecutive periods. Besides interest expenses, 
captured by i, there is also a cost  ρ  related to the (quadratic) magnitude of the stock of debt. 
This cost can be considered as capturing a higher bankruptcy cost or the cost of monitoring 
the bank will bear when lending to the firm. To keep the model simple, capital depreciation is 
ignored, which implies that investment  t I  in (2) is given by the change in the capital stock 
 




t D  represents the firm￿s target dividend level defined as  
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and parameter α  in (2) captures the cost associated with free cash flow within the firm.
3 As is 




By rewriting the budget constraint (2) in terms of investments and substituting for the target 
dividend level from (4) we have 
 
                                                 
3 Note that the term 
*
tt D D −  in (2) represents retained earnings. 
4 The most common way of considering the target dividend level is that it constitutes a fraction of the reported 
income of the current period, and thereby representing the long-run income potential of the firm. However, this 
interpretation of 
* D  means that the firm withholds income and, as a consequence, increases its assets over time. 
The assets may take the form of increases in the capital stock, i.e. investments, or in the bank account. In one 
way or the other, the income remains within the firm and cannot be distributed. Using this interpretation in a 
neoclassical model of firm behavior, the steady-state solution implies that the firm will grow in infinity, a 
scenario that appears unrealistic.  6
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Expression (5) shows that investments will be financed by new borrowing or by retained 
earnings, i.e. the difference between target and actual dividend levels. However, the funds 
available for investment are reduced by the cost of free cash flow that follows from the use of 
retained earnings.  
 
Following a productivity shock, i.e. an exogenous increase in θ , the target dividend level 
increases, as follows from (4). There are two different mechanisms driving the target dividend 
level to its new higher value. First, the target level will increase as a direct consequence of a 
higher θ . Second, since the productivity shock will cause the firm to raise its capital stock, 
the target level also increases due to this effect. 
 
Making use of an Euler equation approach, the optimization problem becomes 
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with the following first order conditions 
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Showing the interaction between the actual and the target dividend levels, it is illustrative to 
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In the long-run, actual dividends, by definition, equal target dividends, i.e. 
*
tt D D = . For this 
to hold, it is clear from (11) that  1
D
tp d λτ =− . Using (6) we therefore conclude that the 
marginal valuation of capital, or Tobin￿s marginal q, equals unity minus the personal tax rate 
on dividends, i.e.  1
KD
tt p d λλ τ == −  in the long-run. It is also clear from (5) that in a long-run 
equilibrium, there is no cost of free cash flow since the entire income is distributed.
5  
 
Following a positive productivity shock, the marginal valuation of capital will increase from 
its long-run value, i.e.  1
K
tp d λτ >− , offering an incentive to increase the existing capital stock 
to match the new level of productivity. From (11), it then follows that actual dividend 
payments will be reduced below the target dividend level, i.e. 
*
tt D D < . The gap between the 
two dividend levels will depend on the magnitude of the cost of deviating from the target 
level, i.e. parameter α .  
 
With a low value of α , the gap between the actual and the target dividend levels may be 
large, see (11). This gap determines the amount of earnings retained for investments. Note, 
however, that the use of debt enables the firm to maintain a higher level of actual dividends 
for a given investment volume, the effect of which is a lower cost of free cash flow. Still, with 
a low value of α , investments will have a strongly negative impact on dividends, which is in 
line with the new view. 
 
With a higher value of α , it follows from (11) that actual dividends will deviate less from the 
target level. Retained earnings become less important as a source of finance, leaving a larger 
fraction of investments to be financed through debt, see (5). With α  very high, actual 
dividends will closely follow the target level, thereby eliminating the cost of free cash flow.  8
Instead, the firm must resort to borrowing, or - though this is not explicitly incorporated in the 
model - issuing new equity as envisioned by the traditional view. Hence, investments should 
have no impact on dividends. 
 
Technically, for new share issues to take place, the marginal valuation of capital must be 
larger than unity. If this is not the case (or if the marginal value has been suppressed to unity 
through the newly issued capital), a high - but not infinitely high - value of α  still implies 
that investments will be financed through retained earnings. Compared to the case with a 
lower value of α , the adjustment process back to the new long-run equilibrium will be 
slower. The implication is then that the traditional view ￿ which is mostly regarded as a 
unique separate case - could be interpreted as a special and temporal case (with α  infinitely 
high) of the extended new view. 
 
3 Numerical simulations 
In order to shed more light on how the model works we next present numerical simulations of 
the firm￿s adjustment following a productivity shock. The simulation procedure requires a 
specification of the firm￿s production function, which takes the form  () tt F KK
ε = , whereε  is 
the share of capital and the pre-shock productivity level is normalized to unity, i.e.  1 θ = . 
Since we are solving the model forward and are not interested in the magnitude of the 
productivity shock (which leads to  1 θ > ), we only have to set the marginal value of capital 
exogenously. 
 
The marginal value of capital equals  1
K
tp d λτ =−  in a long-run equilibrium and, hence, with a 
personal dividend tax rate of 30 percent ( .3 pd τ = ), the marginal value equals  .7
K
t λ = . When 
initiating the simulations, the marginal value of capital is set exogenously at a higher level 
than the long-run value. This causes the firm to raise its capital stock by retaining earnings 
and borrowing. Increasing the capital stock, in turn, reduces 
K
t λ . The simulation procedure is 
repeated until the marginal valuation of capital is eventually reduced to its long-run level, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 It may be the case that the firm faces costs associated with perk consumption due to inefficient production. This 
would then be captured in the production function  () F K . What we explicitly model is the cost associated with 
free cash flow, i.e. retained earnings.   9
1. 7
K
tp d λτ =− = , but now with a larger capital stock. The dynamics of the marginal product 
of capital follows from the first-order condition for capital in (7)
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With  1 t K =  and  .6 t B =  (sample mean, see table 1 below), and arbitrarily setting the marginal 
value of capital equal to  .85
K
t λ =  immediately following upon the productivity shock, we 
obtain the results presented in figures 1 and 2. The outcome depends crucially on the cost of 
perk consumption, i.e. parameter α .
7 In the figures, α  takes on the relatively low value of 
3 α =  in order to clearly illustrate the sources of finance and the relation between dividends 
and investments in accordance with the new view.  
 
Following the productivity shock in period t, investments will increase in order to expand the 
capital stock, see figure 1. Due to the cost of deviating from the target dividend level, the firm 
will not retain all earnings but will instead also make use of debt. If dividends were costless to 
adjust, the firm would rely totally on retained earnings and the stock of debt would remain 
unchanged. Hence, the simulations clearly illustrate the use of debt as an instrument for 
dividend smoothing (cf. the budget constraint in (5)). Note also that the initial borrowing is 
refunded (negative change) from period t+1 and onwards until the stock of debt reaches its 
initial level.
8 This follows from the fact that the cost of free cash flow will fall as the amount 
of retained earnings decreases over time, making debt more expensive as compared to 
retained earnings. Hence, retained earnings are used both as a source of finance for 
investments and for debt amortization. The firm reaches the new long-run equilibrium in 
period t+6, where retained earnings equal zero, i.e. the entire income is distributed. As a 
consequence, investments and new borrowing also equal zero. 
 
                                                 




tt p d λλ τ += − , which is used when simplifying (7) into (12). 
7 The magnitude of other included parameters does not affect the main outcome of the simulations, but only 
affects the length of the adjustment path, the size of the stocks, etc.  
8 By using the first order conditions (7) and (9) we obtain the long-run solution  () ( ) 1 1 t iB βτ ρ + =− + , which 
implies that the stock of debt must be the same in two different long-run equilibriums, since β , τ , i  and  ρ  are 
constant.  10 























Figure 2 illustrates the key implication of the new view, namely that dividends and 
investments are negatively related. Following the productivity shock in period t, the amount 
of actual dividends drops as compared to the target dividend level. The difference between 
actual and target dividend levels represents the amount of retained earnings used for 
investments (as shown in figure 1).  
 
We also emphasize that the magnitude of α  does not affect the meaning of the simulations, 
i.e. the included variable will follow the pattern shown in figures 1 and 2, but it will merely 
affect the time length of the growth path to the new long-run capital stock. Hence, the firms 
will always make use of retained earnings as the marginal source of finance. This holds as 
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valuation of capital over unity. A valuation over unity implies that the firm makes use of new 
equity that immediately suppresses the valuation of capital to unity (from which the valuation 
of capital is further suppressed to its long-run value, as the stock of capital increases through 
retained earnings). In summary, it seems that the traditional view (i.e. new equity as the 
marginal source of finance) only appears as a special and temporal case of the extended new 
view (i.e. retained earnings as a marginal source of finance). 
 
We next turn to an empirical evaluation of the scenarios illustrated in figures 1 and 2 above. 
The empirical analysis is extended to also incorporate other explanatory variables not 
captured in the theoretical model. The aim of the empirical part is to find out whether a 
change in investment needs is financed through a change in cash dividends, i.e. whether firms 
make use of internally generated funds for their marginal investments. It should be noted that 
it is not possible to derive an analytical expression to be estimated in the model presented 
above. The theoretical part should instead be taken as an attempt to intuitively illustrate the 
mechanisms. 
 
4 Data and empirical specifications 
The empirical analysis reported in the next two sections draws on Auerbach and Hassett 
(2000), but we modify the analysis to capture circumstances specific for Swedish data. For 
instance, Swedish firms distribute dividends only once a year, as compared to once a quarter 
in the U.S. We expect a negative relation between cash dividends and investments if the new 
view holds, and we argue that the firms could make use of debt to reduce the gap between 
actual dividends and the target dividend level. The use of debt to smooth dividends is 
determined as a trade-off between the cost associated with free cash flow and that of a higher 
debt level. Hence, we expect the coefficient of debt to be negative when included as an 
explanatory variable for dividends.  
 
Cash flow should also be incorporated as an explanatory variable for dividends. Cash flow 
represents, in principle, the firm￿s after-tax income and is, conditional on the investment 
needs, an important source of dividends (expected positive sign of the coefficient). Finally, 
the firm￿s market value is used as an overall control variable, thereby capturing investors￿ 
expectations about the firm￿s prospects. The market value is assumed to have a positive effect 
on dividends.  12 
 
In defining the variables, it should first be noted that total assets are used to scale each 
variable. Dividend (D) equals the payout from the firm￿s stock of shares and Value (V) equals 
the market value of the firm. Cash flow (C) equals the sum of after-tax income and the value 
of balance-sheet allocations. Investment (I) represents real investments, while short- and long-
run interest bearing loans sum up to Debt (B).
9  
 
The data are obtained from the TRUST
10 database, where income statements and balance 
sheets for firms traded on the Swedish stock market are recorded. Swedish firms are traded on 
different lists depending on their size (market value, history, etc.) and trading volume. To be 
included in the sample, firms are required to be relatively stable over time and belong to the 
manufacturing industry (branches like bank, real estate, insurance, trust, consultancy and 
shipping are ignored).
11 Firms are categorized into one of the following industries: cyclical 
(forestry, primary, etc.), heavy manufacturing (steel, cars, etc.), ordinary manufacturing 
(construction, consumer goods, etc.), trading (clothes, food, etc.), and other (transportation, 
power, etc.). 
 
However, the TRUST database does not include the firms￿ market value of equity, which has 
been obtained from the less comprehensive database FINLIS. After merging the two 
databases, the sample consists an unbalanced panel of 145 firms (1462 observations) during 
the period 1980 to 1998. Since the market values are measured as of December 31 each year, 
firms with non-calendar accounting periods were excluded (10 firms). Further, 24 
observations have been excluded due to missing information in the variable depreciation 
according to plan and 13 observations due to unrealistic observations.
12 Finally, since the 
theory is best suited for mature firms and since we will make use of lagged variables in the 
                                                 
9 Further, even though new equity is neither incorporated in the theoretical model nor in the econometric 
specifications, we will still use it below as an indicator (0/1) of accessibility to the capital market. The variable 
New share issue (N) represents the amount of contributed new equity. 
10 TRUST, as well as the below mentioned FINLIS, are administered by SIX (Stockholm Information 
Exchange). 
11 The collected data used in the analysis follow, in principle, that of Hamberg (2000). Although the selection 
criterion is somewhat subjective, we find the data collected by Hamberg to be reliable and representative, since 
Hamberg reports an extensive verification of the data. The reason for focusing on the manufacturing industry is 
that those firms are best suited for the theory. 
12  1 C <−  (1 observation),  1 B >  (2 observations),  20 V >  (1 observation) and  0 N <  (9 observations).  13 
specifications, the firms are required to have records of at least five consecutive years and 
they must have positive dividends in at least one of these years (24 firms and 79 observations 
are dropped due to those requirements).
13 This leaves a sample of 111 firms and 1205 
observations. The sample statistics are found in table 1.
14  
 
Table A.1. Sample statistics, aggregated over the period 1980-1998. 
Variable    Mean  Standard Deviation  Min  Max  Expected sign 
Dividend  D  .0148 .0164  0  .2820  
Investment  I  .1053 .0870  0  .7901  negative 
Cash Flow  C  .0807 .0596 -.3450  .5061  positive 
Value  V  .6583 .6699 .0223  8.7652  positive 
Debt  B  .5960 .1420 .0208  .9374  negative 
Note: All variables scaled by total assets. Number of observations: 1205 
 
It is worth emphasizing the timing of the firms￿ decisions and dividend payments. Swedish 
firms pay dividends once a year. Dividends for period t are paid to the shareholders at the 
beginning of period  1 t + . Consequently, according to the accounts, the firms￿ investment and 
debt policies in period t, with the resulting consequences on their cash flow and market value 
affect dividends distributed in period  1 t + , i.e.  () 1 ,,, tt t t t D fICB V + = . 
 
As a consequence of distributing dividends once a year, the frequency of variations in 
dividend between two consecutive years is very high (93.4 percent). The dividend level was 
increased in 57.0 percent, decreased in 36.4 percent and remained unchanged in 6.6 percent of 
the periods. Further, the variable Dividend is equal to zero in 9.5 percent of the observations, 
to be compared with the 18 percent of zero observations in the U.S. data reported by 
Auerbach and Hassett (2000). One potential explanation for the difference is the possibility 
for U.S. firms to transfer income through repurchases of their own shares, which effectively 
reduces the need for dividends. Repurchases of own shares were not allowed in Sweden 
during the sample period.  
 
Since the number of observations with zero dividends was as high as 18 percent for the U.S. 
data, Auerbach and Hassett (2000) chose to run non-linear tobit specifications. To capture 
                                                 
13 We will also calculate firm-specific autocorrelation coefficients, which become more accurate with several 
time periods.  
14 Figure A.1. in the appendix illustrates the sample statistics as a year-by-year aggregate.  14 
differences between firms, they include a large number of dummy variables, such as industry 
and size dummies, in the base specifications, as well as dummies for bond rating and analysts￿ 
forecasts in the more detailed specifications. Further, Auerbach and Hassett run the 
specifications in levels.  For comparison we will run the same tobit specifications for the 
Swedish data. However, the theoretical set-up offers support for performing the analysis in 
first differences. In addition, for Swedish data it seems more appropriate to run the analysis in 
differences, since we have a large variation in the dependent variable between two 
consecutive periods. As a result, the number of zero observations in the dependent variable is 
considerably lower for the Swedish data, so we will make use of the properties of the panel 
and run simple linear specifications in first differences. 
 
5 Results 
We first replicate the basic tobit specifications presented in Auerbach and Hassett (2000) on 
Swedish data and then present the linear specification in first differences. Column I in table 2 
gives a first hint of the result. Running dividends on lagged explanatory variables (in levels) 
and time dummies, it is clear that the coefficient of investment has a negative sign. As 
expected, cash flow has a positive effect on dividends and the stock of debt has the predicted 
negative impact. However, the market value does not show a significant positive effect. The 




However, the initial result may just be a result of long-run differences among firms. Since we 
are mainly interested in explaining short-run fluctuations in dividends, following a 
productivity shock for instance, we must eliminate any long-run permanent cross-section 
variation. We therefore include a set of dummy variables for classification of the firms. First, 
the firms are classified into one of the five industries reported in section 4. Second, size 






th and above the 90
th. Finally, to capture any dynamics in the 
process, Auerbach and Hassett (2000) also include an additional lag of the explanatory 
variables. The result of this specification on Swedish data is found in column II of table 2. 
The first lag of the market value now has a significant positive effect on dividends, but the 
                                                 
15 The U.S. data show a significant positive effect of the market value.  15 
second lag has the opposite effect. Investments and cash flow have a negative and positive 
effect, respectively, on dividends in both lags. Hence, it seems that dividends do respond to 
short-run fluctuations in investment needs and, especially, the positive impact of the market 
value does not eliminate the impact of either investments or cash flow. The initial result 
supporting the new view is thus strengthened. Once more, the result is well in line with that 
presented by Auerbach and Hassett.
16  
 
Table 2. Tobit specifications (in levels). Dependent D(t). 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Sample  All  All  A-list  Not A-list  High probability  Low probability 
I(t-1) -.0172
** -.0188
*     -.0086  -.0250
* -.0083  -.0222 
  (.0061)  (.0075)      (.0067)  (.0123)  (.0044)  (.0147) 
I(t-2)   -.0090
*     -.0074  -.0073  .0004  -.0361 
    (.0042)      (.0064)  (.0058)  (.0042)  (.0198) 
C(t-1) .1136
** .1113





  (.0233)  (.0258)       (.0226)  (.0402)  (.0123)  (.0624) 
C(t-2)   .0440
**     .0177  .0613
** .0250
** .0297 
    (.0119)       (.0160)  (.0165)  (.0092)  (.0257) 
V(t-1) .0013 .0044
*     .0036  .0071
** .0008  .0030 
  (.0009)  (.0018)       (.0028)  (.0022  (.0014)  (.0044) 
V(t-2)   -.0043
**     -.0025  -.0049
** .0007  -.0076 
    (.0017)      (.0030)  (.0019)  (.0015)  (.0048) 
B(t-1) -.0361
** -.0181
*     -.0299
** -.0106  -.0137
* -.0345 
  (.0049)  (.0087)      (.0092)  (.0128)  (.0069)  (.0215) 
B(t-2)   -.0239
**     -.0221
* -.0186  -.0106  -.0410
* 
    (.0075)      (.0086)  (.0109)  (.0068)  (.0190) 
         
Dummies:            
Year Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Size No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Obs. 1205 1094 556  538  393  394 
Note: 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All variables are in 
levels. The A-list is defined as those firms traded on the A-list (the main list) and the Not A-list capture firms traded on all 
other lists. Low probability is defined as those firms with an estimate (probit) in the percentile 0-40 of the sample and High 
probability is defined as those firms with an estimate (probit) in the percentile 60-100 of the sample.  
 
Since the explanatory variable debt (B) is directly affected by the possibility to borrow funds 
from the capital market, and since the alternative source of finance to retained earnings and 
debt is new share issues (explicitly not in the model), it is motivated to incorporate 
accessibility to the capital market in the empirical specification to capture if the firms are 
                                                 
16 With the difference that the second lag of the market value is insignificant in Swedish data.  16 
financially constrained. Auerbach and Hassett (2000) utilize two measures; bond rating and 
whether the firms have analysts￿ forecasts. Such measures are not available in Swedish data. 
Instead we split the sample according to the firms￿ stock market listings. Firms on the so-
called A-list have a high trading volume, stable market value, etc., which should contribute to 
good access to the capital market. Several minor lists exist, but they are aggregated into a Not 
A-list in the empirical work. Firms traded on those lists are assumed to have weaker access to 
the capital market. Several interesting results are displayed in columns III and IV of table 2.  
 
For both sub-samples, we find that cash flow has a positive impact on dividends, where the 
estimate is lowest for the firms traded on the A-list. This is an expected result, since firms 
traded on the Not A-list do not have the same access to the capital market, thereby making 
dividends more dependent on internally generated funds. Further, the negative impact of 
investments on dividends is insignificant for firms on the A-list, as well as the positive effect 
of the firms￿ market value. Fluctuations in dividends are instead solely explained by cash flow 
and debt, which is in sharp contrast with the firms on the Not A-list, where investments and 
market value do have a significant effect on dividends. On the other hand, debt is insignificant 
for those firms.  
 
Hence, the firms on the A-list can make use of debt to the extent that dividends can always be 
smoothed over time, and thereby make them unaffected by both investments and market 
value. In terms of the theoretical model of section 2, parameter α  seems to be high, which is 
explained by the high level of asymmetric information between managers and owners in the 
firms traded on the A-list. In contrast, dividends do respond to investments in the firms on the 
Not A-list (these firms do not have the same access to the debt market). These results are in 
line with the extended new view.
17 Although Auerbach and Hassett (2000) make use of other 
dummies for splitting the sample, it is interesting to compare the results for the U.S. and 
Sweden. Both investments and cash flow show an insignificant effect for firms with high 
access to the capital market, and a higher coefficient of cash flow for firms with less 
accessibility.    
 
                                                 
17 An alternative explanation is that, due to a high accessibility to the capital market, firms on the A-list can make 
use of new equity as their source of finance. If this is the case, the cost of perk consumption is infinitely high, 
leading the firm to distribute its entire income, which rejects the implication of the new view.  17 
In order to shed more light on how the accessibility to new equity affects the result, Auerbach 
and Hassett (2000) split the sample according to the probability of issuing new equity. The 
fixed costs of issuing equity probably encourage firms to issue larger amounts than needed for 
the current period. Hence, there are strong reasons to believe that the variable New share issue 
does not reflect year-specific changes. But, for the classification of firms and their access to 
the external capital market this is no problem. With the same explanatory variables and 
dummies as above, but with the amount of new share issues as the dependent variable, we run 
a probit model, where the estimates, interpreted as the probabilities of issuing new equity, are 
used for splitting the sample. It turns out that only Investment has a significant effect on the 
decision whether to issue equity.
18 
 
The two last columns of table 2, i.e. columns V and VI, display the result according to this 
new split. Starting out with the cash flow variable, the magnitude of the estimate is 
considerably higher for firms with a low probability of issuing new equity. This is in 
accordance with the list dependent split above. The high impact for those firms is explained 
by a weaker access to the capital market, i.e. borrowing for smoothing dividends or new 
equity for financing investments. Both investment and market value have the expected signs, 
but are insignificant. For firms with good access to the capital market, the result follows that 
of column III, and may once again be explained by the use of debt for smoothing dividends. 
However, we would expect that the investment needs of the firms in the low probability 
sample, i.e. with weaker access to the capital market, should respond to fluctuations in 
dividends if the new view best describes the firms￿ financial decision. But this is not the case 
(even though the coefficients show the expected signs), and the conclusion is that the new 
view hypothesis of a negative response in dividends to investment needs does not hold in this 
particular specification for the Swedish data. 
 
Cash flow and debt in the Swedish data follows the same pattern as in the U.S. data reported 
by Auerbach and Hassett (2000). The market value is insignificant for high probability firms 
                                                 
18 The parameter values are as follows (with robust standard errors in parenthesis): I(t-1): 1.9742 (.5644); I(t-2): 
1.8307 (.5763); C(t-1): .1045 (1.0381); C(t-2): .7660 (.9484); V(t-1): .1098 (.1702); V(t-2): .0753 (.1643); B(t-1): 
.4327 (.8160); B(t-2): .5994 (.8042). With an estimate in the percentile 0-40 of the sample, the firm is 
categorized as having a low probability of obtaining funds from the external market. On the other hand, high 
probability firms are those with an estimate in the percentile 60-100 of the sample. The middle observations are 
excluded in order to have two distinct different samples.   18 
in both Sweden and the U.S., but significant for low probability firms in the U.S. Further, in 
the U.S. data, investments are negatively related to dividends in both sub-samples, confirming 
the implication of the new view in the U.S. 
 
To sum up the first part of the empirical analysis, the implication of the new view that 
dividends should respond negatively to investments is partly found in the Swedish data. The 
effect of investments is not as robust for different specifications based on the sub-samples as 
cash flow. The positive effect of cash flow is strong, robust for different specifications and 
acts as predicted in the different sub-samples. The other explanatory variables show the 
expected sign, but are not always significant. The result on Swedish data is comparable to that 
derived in Auerbach and Hassett (2000), but is not as strong and convincing. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, we will adjust the empirical specifications to better fit the 
theoretical model and the Swedish data. However, we will make use of the same set-up in the 
use of sample splits as in the first part of the analysis. As is clear from the theoretical model 
and the result of the simulations presented in figures 1 and 2, we are interested in how a 
change in the investment pattern changes the amount of cash dividends. For that reason, we 
will define the variables in differences.
19 Further, since there is a high variation in the 
dividend level between two subsequent time periods (because Swedish firms only distribute 
dividends once a year) and relatively few zero observations, we will run ordinary least 




                                                 
19 Since we are using a first-difference estimator, the size and industry dummies used in the level specifications 
in table 2 will be dealt with by the differentiation and are therefore omitted. Including these, although having a 
different interpretation compared to the level specifications reported in table 2, do not change the results. 
20 We did also run ordinary least squares in levels on the specifications as in table 2. The conclusions follow that 
of the tobit specifications. As an alternative to a first-difference estimator, we could have used fixed or random 
effect specifications in levels. A Hausman test rejects the random effect specification due to correlation between 
the explanatory variables and the disturbance term. The within estimator (fixed effect model) gives the predicted 
signs of the explanatory variables (at the same significance level, basically).  
21 As a consequence of using a first-difference estimation procedure, the disturbances will be correlated. We will 
control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by employing the method put forward by Praise and Winsten 
(cf. Green (1997)). The errors follow a first order firm-specific autocorrelation process (AR(1)) and we control 
for heteroskedasticity within but assume no correlation between firms. The conclusions remain the same, even 
when the firms face the same AR(1) process.  19 
Table 3. Ordinary least square specifications (in first differences). Dependent ∆D(t). 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
Sample  All  A-list  Not A-list  High probability  Low probability 
∆I(t-1) -.0088
*  -.0044     -.0112
*  -.0052
*  -.0247 
  (.0041)      (.0061)  (.0051)  (.0025)  (.0140) 
∆C(t-1) .0370
**     .0180    .0452
**  .0053 .0799
** 
  (.0216)       (.0108)  (.0165)  (.0070)  (.0219) 
∆V(t-1) .0053
**     .0069
**  .0046
**  .0008 .0134
** 
  (.0012)       (.0020)  (.0015)  (.0008)  (.0042) 
∆B(t-1) -.0199
**     -.0205
  -.0194
*  -.0271
**  -.0100 
  (.0072)      (.0112)  (.0085)  (.0052)  (.0213) 
const. -.0004
  -.0007 .0012  -.0082  -.0003 
 (.0018)  (.0019)  (.0048) (.0050)  (.0049) 
        
Dummy:          
Year Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
R
2 0.1695  0.1472  0.2261  0.4461  0.1466 
Obs. 1094 556  538  393  394 
Note: 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels. The results are corrected for both autocorrelated (first order firm-
specific autocorrelation) and heteroskedastic disturbances. All variables are in first differences. The A-list is defined as those 
firms traded on the A-list (the main list) and the Not A-list captures firms traded on all other lists. Low probability is defined 
as those firms with an estimate (probit) in the percentile 0-40 of the sample and High probability is defined as those firms 
with an estimate (probit) in the percentile 60-100 of the sample. 
 
The first column of table 3 shows the result from the basic specification. The first difference 
in investment is significantly negative in explaining changes in dividends, which is in line 
with the simulations presented in figures 1 and 2. The other explanatory variables have the 
predicted signs and are highly significant. Thus, the result clearly supports the new view. 
 
Following the first part of the analysis, we next control for any financial constraints and 
examine how these affect the initial result. We will first split the sample according to trading 
lists, and, second, also make use of the split according to the probabilities of issuing new 
equity. When splitting the sample according the trading lists, do remember that firms on the 
main list (A-list) are supposed to have a high accessibility to the external market as compared 
to other firms (Not A-list). The result of the split is presented in columns II and III of table 3.    
 
For firms traded on the A-list, the negative impact of a change in investments on the first 
difference in dividends is insignificant, as is the effects of the changes in the firm￿s cash flow 
and stock of debt (the estimates have the predicted signs, however). Fluctuations in dividends 
are instead explained solely by changes in market value. This is in sharp contrast to firms 
traded on the Not A-list where, besides investments, cash flow and market value, the first  20 
difference in debt also have a significant effect on dividend changes. These results are 
difficult to interpret because the significant result between debt and dividends only for firms 
traded on the Not A-list shows that we have probably not obtained the desired split into firms 
with good and weak accessibility to the capital market. 
 
Since the split according to the probability of issuing new equity draws on actual behavior, it 
constitutes a better base for capturing whether the firm is financially constrained. The last two 
columns of table 3 display the result of this split. Note that debt does not explain dividend 
changes for firms with a low probability of issuing new shares (column V), which is 
interpreted as weak access to the capital market. Hence, this split seems to be more relevant. 
The variable cash flow is significant in explaining changes in dividend for firms with weak 
access to the capital market (column V), but insignificant for firms with good access (column 
IV). The first difference in investment is significant for firms that are not financially 
constrained (column IV) and shows the predicted sign for firms with a low accessibility to the 
capital market (column V). This result gives strong support for the implication of the new 
view since a change in investment still affects dividends, even though the firms have a good 
accessibility to new equity. And since this seems to be the most accurate specification in table 
3, the conclusion from the second part of the analysis is that Swedish data support the new 
view of equity. 
 
6 Summary 
In the theoretical part, we set up a simple neoclassical model of firm behavior where the firm 
faces a cost of adjusting the dividend level because of an aggravated free cash flow problem. 
The existence of such a cost - which has been an argument for the traditional view of equity - 
does not invalidate the core of the new view, namely that the marginal investment may be 
financed with retained earnings. As suggested by Auerbach and Hassett (2000), the 
combination of costly changes in dividends and retained earnings as the marginal source of 
funds actually defines an extended new view of equity. The traditional view then appears as a 
special and temporal case of this extended new view, where the firm faces infinitely high 
costs of adjusting dividends to finance investments.  
 
In the empirical part of the paper, we test the implication of the new view that dividends and 
investments are negatively related. For comparison we first run the same tobit specifications  21 
as in Auerbach and Hassett for the Swedish data. However, the theoretical set-up, as well as 
the Swedish data, offers support for performing the analysis in first differences, so, secondly, 
we extend the analysis and make use of a first-difference estimator. The overall conclusion is 
that the implication of the new view is supported for traded Swedish firms during 1980-98.  
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